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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Frank Cefaratti, who pleaded guilty to four counts arising 
from his execution of a scheme to defraud the United States 
Department of Education (DOE) out of student financial 
assistance funds, now appeals, arguing that the District 
Court erred in accepting his plea to the count charging him 
with engaging in monetary transactions in the proceeds of 
specified unlawful activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1957. 
He also challenges his sentence of 51 months 
imprisonment. 
 
I. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
A. 
 
Procedural History 
 
On September 8, 1998, a grand jury returned a 27-count 
indictment against Cefaratti charging him as follows: 
Counts I through XX with mail fraud in violation of 18 
U.S.C. S 1341, Counts XXI and XXII with wire fraud in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1343, Count XXIII with fraudulently 
obtaining student financial aid funds in violation of 20 
U.S.C. S 1097(a), Count XXIV with conducting a series of 
financial transactions in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
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S 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and S 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), and Counts XXV 
through XXVII with offenses relating to obstruction of 
justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1512(b)(1), 18 U.S.C. 
S 1503, and 18 U.S.C. S 2232(a), respectively. 
 
At his arraignment on September 25, 1998, Cefaratti 
pleaded not guilty and was released after executing an 
unsecured bond. Thereafter, he entered into a plea 
agreement with the government, filed on October 28, 1998, 
to plead guilty to Count IV, one of the mail fraud counts, to 
Count XXIII, the student loan fraud count, and to Count 
XXVII, charging destruction of property to prevent seizure.1 
Cefaratti also agreed to waive indictment and plead guilty 
to a superseding information charging him with engaging in 
monetary transactions in property derived from specified 
unlawful activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1957(a). The 
S 1957 charge is of a lesser offense than theS 1956 charge 
in the original indictment, as conviction of S 1957 carries a 
maximum sentence of ten years imprisonment instead of 
the twenty years maximum for S 1956. In return the 
government agreed, inter alia, to move for dismissal of the 
remaining counts, bring no further charges (other than 
criminal tax charges) related to Cefaratti's offense conduct, 
recommend a sentence within the applicable guideline 
range, and, if Cefaratti adequately demonstrated his 
acceptance of responsibility, recommend a three-point 
reduction on that basis. 
 
Cefaratti entered his guilty plea at a hearing on October 
30, 1998. The presentence report (PSR) calculated a total 
offense level of 24 and, based on Cefaratti's criminal history 
category of I, set the applicable guideline range of 51 to 63 
months. Cefaratti objected to the PSR on two grounds: that 
the report erroneously applied a two-level leadership 
adjustment under U.S.S.G. S 3B1.1(c) and that the 
sentencing range of 51 to 63 months was 
unconstitutionally disproportionate to the sentences 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The plea agreement mistakenly designates this count as Count 28. JA 
at 50. The underlying conduct involves Cefaratti's seizure of a tape 
recording and an original transcript of an incriminating conversation 
between him and his sister Carole from the office of the Postal Inspection 
Service, and his subsequent destruction of those materials. 
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imposed on other participants in his offenses. At sentencing 
the District Court overruled Cefaratti's objections to the 
PSR as well as his requests for downward departure, 
referring to the matter before it as "typical . .. . [of a] fraud 
offense . . . ." JA at 145. The court found that the two-level 
adjustment for playing a leadership role was warranted and 
imposed a sentence of 51 months, the low end of the 
guideline range, to be followed by a two year period of 
supervised release. The court also imposed $350 in special 
assessments and restitution of $846,000 to the DOE. 
 
Cefaratti appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1291 and 18 U.S.C. S 3742(a). 
 
B. 
 
The Offense Conduct 
 
According to the indictment and the PSR, Cefaratti was 
an owner and also the president of the Franklin School of 
Cosmetology and Hair Design in Elizabeth, New Jersey ("the 
Franklin School" or "Franklin"), one of two vocational 
schools for aspiring beauticians formerly owned by 
Cefaratti's mother. The Franklin School participated in 
federal student financial assistance programs, which 
authorized it to act as a disbursing agent for federally 
funded Pell Grants and to receive Stafford loan checks. The 
Pell Grant program provides needy students with 
educational grant funds without need for repayment, and 
the Stafford Loan program provides for federal 
reimbursement of defaulted student loans, thereby enabling 
students to obtain low-interest loans from private lenders. 
 
Cefaratti, on behalf of the Franklin School, entered into 
program participation agreements with the DOE agreeing to 
comply with all program statutes and regulations, to use 
the funds solely for specified educational purposes, and to 
properly account for the funds the school received. Under 
DOE regulations, students were eligible for federalfinancial 
assistance only if they had a high school diploma, a general 
education development certificate (GED), or passed a test 
demonstrating their ability to benefit from the training 
offered by the school (ATB test). The DOE could terminate 
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a school's participation in federal student assistance 
programs if the school's students defaulted at excessive 
rates. A student was considered to be in default after a 180 
day grace period if the student failed to make payments 
unless the student was granted a deferment or forbearance 
for his or her repayment obligations. Default rates in excess 
of 25 percent for three consecutive years could result in a 
school's termination from the Stafford Loan program, and a 
default rate in excess of 40 percent in a single year could 
result in termination from the Pell Grant program. 
 
In 1993, the DOE determined that Franklin's default 
rates for 1991 and 1992 had exceeded 50 percent. 
Sometime prior to 1994 and continuing to about July 7, 
1997, Cefaratti implemented a scheme to manipulate 
Franklin's default rate by submitting false deferment and 
forbearance forms to student loan lenders and by making 
payments on behalf of student borrowers who were on the 
verge of defaulting. To accomplish this, Cefaratti directed 
Gloria Malavet, Franklin's Director of Admissions, and 
Modesta Perez, its Director of Financial Aid, to monitor the 
loan repayment status of former students and to prepare 
falsified, forged forbearance or deferment forms when a 
student was near defaulting. These forms were then mailed 
to lenders, including the Pennsylvania Higher Education 
Assistance Agency (PHEAA) and the Student Loan 
Marketing Association (SALLIE MAE). For example, Count 
IV of the indictment, the mail fraud count to which 
Cefaratti pleaded guilty, charged that between November 4, 
1994 and November 7, 1994, Cefaratti caused the mailing 
of a falsified, forged Unemployment Deferment Request 
Form to SALLIE MAE on behalf of a former Franklin 
student. 
 
Cefaratti also directed Malavet and Perez to make 
payments on behalf of student borrowers who were near 
default (without the student borrowers' knowledge) and had 
Jackie Lopez, Franklin's Secretary, open a post office box in 
her name to which lenders could send mail addressed to 
students for whom false forbearance and deferment forms 
had been submitted. In addition, Cefaratti had Franklin 
employees "clean and organize" the school'sfiles so that a 
DOE audit would not discover that many of Franklin's 
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students had excessive absences or that Franklin had 
submitted loan applications from students who did not 
have a high school diploma, a GED, or a passing ATB test 
score. 
 
These activities kept the Franklin School's default rate 
artificially low, ensuring the school's continuing eligibility to 
receive federal funding and permitting Franklin to retain 
funds it would otherwise have had to return. From July 
1994 to July 1997, over 90 percent of Franklin's revenues 
came from these federal assistance programs. Had Cefaratti 
not manipulated Franklin's default rate in this manner, the 
DOE would have terminated the school's participation in 
federal student assistance programs no later than February 
of 1996 rather than, as eventually happened, in July 1997. 
Between February 1996 and July 1997, Franklin received 
over $840,000 in federal funds to which it was not entitled. 
 
II. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Cefaratti states three issues on appeal. First, he 
contends, admittedly for the first time, that the superseding 
information charging that he engaged in monetary 
transactions in property derived from specified unlawful 
activity failed to charge, and the record did not establish a 
factual basis to show, that the funds involved in the 
transactions constituted "proceeds" of mail or wire fraud. 
Second, he contends that his sentence for engaging in such 
monetary transactions should have been calculated using 
the fraud guidelines rather than the money laundering 
guidelines. Finally, he contends that his guideline range 
was improperly adjusted upwards two levels under U.S.S.G. 
S 3B1.1(c) for a leadership role in the offenses. Our 
standard of review for each claim varies and will be noted 
in each discussion. 
 
A. 
 
Money Laundering Under 18 U.S.C. S 1957 
 
Count XXIV of the indictment charged Cefaratti with 
violations of S 1956 of the Money Laundering Control Act of 
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1986. As explained in an opinion from the Tenth Circuit, 
that statute criminalizes "money laundering as that activity 
is commonly understood. . . . [by punishing] conducting a 
financial transaction with the proceeds of specified 
unlawful activity knowing that the transaction is designed 
to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, 
ownership or control of the proceeds, or intending that the 
transaction be so designed." United States v. Allen, 129 
F.3d 1159, 1164-65 (10th Cir. 1997). The government 
agreed to drop this count in exchange for Cefaratti's guilty 
plea to the superseding information, which charged him 
with violating S 1957 of the same act. Section 1957 "is 
similar to 18 U.S.C. S 1956, but does not require that the 
recipient exchange or `launder' the funds, that he have 
knowledge that the funds were proceeds of a specified 
unlawful activity, nor that he have any intent to further or 
conceal such an activity." U.S.S.G. S 2S1.2, Commentary. 
Instead, "[a] defendant must know only that she is engaging 
in a transaction and that the subject of the transaction is 
criminally derived property." Allen, 129 F.3d at 1165. 
 
Specifically, S 1957 makes it illegal to"knowingly 
engage[ ] or attempt[ ] to engage in a monetary transaction 
in criminally derived property that is of a value greater than 
$10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity 
. . . ." 18 U.S.C. S 1957(a); see also United States v. 
Sokolow, 91 F.3d 396, 408 (3d Cir. 1996) (listing elements 
of S 1957 offense). The statute defines a"monetary 
transaction" as "the deposit, withdrawal, transfer, or 
exchange, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of 
funds or a monetary instrument . . . by, through, or to a 
financial institution . . . ." 18 U.S.C. S 1957(f)(1). 
"Criminally derived property" is "any property constituting, 
or derived from, proceeds obtained from a criminal offense 
. . . ." 18 U.S.C. S 1957(f)(2). Section 1957 incorporates the 
definition of "specified unlawful activity" in 18 U.S.C. 
S 1956, which includes, inter alia, those acts that constitute 
"racketeering activity" under the Racketeer Influenced & 
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). See 18 U.S.C. 
SS 1956(c)(7)(A) & 1957(f)(3). Wire and mail fraud constitute 
racketeering activity and therefore are "specified unlawful 
activities." See 18 U.S.C. S 1961(1)(B). 
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Cefaratti argues that the superseding information was 
deficient because it failed to charge an essential element of 
a S 1957 offense -- that the funds involved in the monetary 
transaction constituted or were derived from proceeds 
obtained from specified unlawful activity. Although he did 
not raise this argument before the District Court, we will 
consider it in light of our prior holding that a defendant 
may challenge an indictment for failure to charge an offense 
for the first time on appeal. See United States v. Spinner, 
180 F.3d 514, 516 (3d Cir. 1999); see also United States v. 
Cabrera-Teran, 168 F.3d 141, 143 (5th Cir. 1999).2 
However, when a challenge is urged for the first time on 
appeal we will construe the indictment liberally in favor of 
validity. See United States v. Ross, 206 F.3d 896, 899 (9th 
Cir. 2000); United States v. Sutton, 961 F.2d 476, 479 (4th 
Cir. 1992). 
 
The superseding information charged that: 
 
       Beginning prior to on or about July 1994 and 
       continuing up to on or about July 7, 1997 . . . 
       CEFARATTI, and others known, but not named 
       herein, did knowingly engage and attempt to engage in 
       monetary transactions affecting interstate commerce, 
       in criminally derived property of a value greater than 
       $10,000, that is, [Cefaratti] caused the transfer of both 
       Federal Pell Grant Program funds from the Federal 
       Reserve Bank . . . and the transfer of Federal Stafford 
       Loan Program funds from a federally-insured bank . .. 
       to the bank account of the Franklin Beauty School . . . 
       in an amount in excess of $840,000, such criminally 
       derived property having been derived from a specified 
       unlawful activity, that is, mail fraud and wire fraud, 
       and did aid and abet. 
 
JA at 47-48. Cefaratti reads the information to charge 
merely that some form of "criminally derived property" was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Here, Cefaratti pleaded guilty to an information charging the S 1957 
offense and, in doing so, waived his right to indictment by grand jury. 
That fact, however, is immaterial to this issue. See Government of the 
Virgin Islands v. Moolenar, 133 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 1998) ("The 
sufficiency of an information, like the sufficiency of an indictment, 
presents a question of law over which our review is plenary."). 
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"derived from a specified unlawful activity," and argues that 
in contrast the statute requires that the criminally derived 
property "constitute or `be derived from, proceeds obtained 
from a criminal offense.' " Appellant's Br. at 17 (quoting 18 
U.S.C. S 1957(f)(2)). 
 
An indictment (for our purposes, an information) to be 
sufficient must contain all essential elements of the 
charged offense. See Spinner, 180 F.3d at 515. However, an 
indictment may "set forth the offense in the words of the 
statute itself, as long as `those words of themselves fully, 
directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or 
ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute 
the offence intended to be punished.' " Hamling v. United 
States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974) (quoting United States v. 
Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1882)). Furthermore, an 
indictment that charges a legal term of art "sufficiently 
charges the component parts of the term." United States v. 
Wicks, 187 F.3d 426, 429 (4th Cir. 1999); see also United 
States v. Kovach, 208 F.3d 1215, 1219 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(indictment that alleged defendant possessed forged 
security of an "organization" adequately alleged interstate 
commerce element where statutory definition of 
"organization" expressly incorporated that element); 
Hamling, 418 U.S. at 118-19 (indictment alleging material 
was "obscene" was adequate although it did not set forth 
the components of the obscenity test). 
 
As we construe the information liberally, we reject 
Cefaratti's contention that it fails to allege each element of 
the offense. The information tracks the statutory language 
by alleging that Cefaratti knowingly engaged and attempted 
to engage in monetary transactions affecting interstate 
commerce in criminally derived property valued over 
$10,000, that property having been derived from the 
specified unlawful activity of wire and mail fraud. Cefaratti 
argues that the term "criminally derived property" in the 
information could be read to include property that is 
neither proceeds nor derived from proceeds of a criminal 
offense. But the statute specifically defines the term, and 
Cefaratti had only to read the statutory section under 
which he was charged to understand that the "criminally 
derived property" at issue -- Federal Pell Grant and 
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Stafford loan funds -- was alleged to "constitut[e], or [be] 
derived from, proceeds obtained from a criminal offense 
. . . ." 18 U.S.C. S 1957(f)(2). 
 
Cefaratti also contends that he was not informed of the 
nature of the charges against him because neither the 
District Court nor the prosecutor explained the elements of 
an offense under S 1957. He relies on Fed. R. Crim. P. 
11(c)(1), which requires the court, before accepting a guilty 
plea, to address the defendant personally in open court and 
inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant 
understands, "the nature of the charge to which the plea is 
offered . . . ." Rule 11, however, "is not to be read as 
requiring a litany or other ritual," and "should not be given 
such a crabbed interpretation that ceremony [is] exalted 
over substance." Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 advisory committee 
note (1983) (Rule 11(h)). Indeed, most courts look to the 
totality of the circumstances to determine whether a 
defendant was informed of the nature of the charges 
against him, considering factors such as the complexity of 
the charge, the age, intelligence, and education of the 
defendant, and whether the defendant was represented by 
counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 205 F.3d 
1020, 1025 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Mosley, 173 
F.3d 1318, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. 
Marks, 38 F.3d 1009, 1012 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 
Cefaratti acknowledges that the elements of the offense 
"need not be recited in any ritualistic fashion." Appellant's 
Br. at 19. He nevertheless argues that the District Court 
failed to ensure he understood the S 1957 offense, relying 
on statements in our prior cases urging the district courts 
of this circuit to "maintain strict observance to the 
requirements specified in Rule 11 in order to assure the 
integrity and finality of the plea process." United States v. 
Carter, 619 F.2d 293, 296 (3d Cir. 1980), superseded by 
statute as stated in United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 7 
(3d Cir. 1987). We agree with the articulated principle, but 
it is inapplicable here because any deviation from those 
requirements, if it occurred, was harmless. Rule 11 itself 
provides that "[a]ny variance from the procedures required 
by this Rule 11 which does not affect substantial rights 
shall be disregarded." Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(h). This harmless 
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error standard "permit[s] rejection of a Rule 11(c) challenge 
where the record plainly shows that the defendant 
understood the nature of the charges despite a flawed 
inquiry by the court." United States v. Maher , 108 F.3d 
1513, 1521 (2d Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Liboro, 
10 F.3d 861, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (question is whether the 
defendant "was sufficiently apprised of the charges and 
comprehended them"). 
 
Here, the District Court conducted a detailed inquiry into 
whether Cefaratti's plea was knowing and voluntary. 
During that inquiry, Cefaratti stated that he had reviewed 
the information and plea agreement with his retained 
counsel, that he was satisfied with his counsel's 
performance, that he did not wish to have the superseding 
information read to him in open court, and that he wished 
to waive indictment on the S 1957 offense. Finally, the 
prosecutor summarized the evidence supporting each 
offense, and Cefaratti informed the court that he had no 
substantial dispute with the summary. The court accepted 
his plea and entered an order finding that Cefaratti 
understood "his rights [and] the consequences of his plea" 
and stating that "[t]he Court is satisfied that the plea has 
a basis in fact and contains all the elements of the crime 
charged." JA. at 82. 
 
As this recitation of the events shows, although the 
District Court did not specifically inform Cefaratti of the 
elements of an offense under S 1957, it conducted an 
otherwise extensive inquiry at the plea hearing. Although 
Cefaratti complains that "nothing was done . . . to ensure" 
that he understood S 1957's requirement that criminally 
derived property "constitute or be `derived from, proceeds 
obtained from a criminal offense,' " Appellant's Br. at 20 
(quoting 18 U.S.C. S 1957(f)(2)), he does not explicitly state 
that he misunderstood any aspect of the S 1957 charge. 
Given the facts of this case, such a claim would be dubious 
at best. 
 
Cefaratti reviewed the S 1957 charge in the superseding 
information with his retained counsel, see United States v. 
Andrades, 169 F.3d 131, 135 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting 
presumption that defense counsel routinely explain the 
offense in sufficient detail to give the accused notice of what 
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he is being asked to admit), and listened to and acquiesced 
in the government's summary of facts supporting that 
charge. As we conclude above, the information alleged each 
element of the S 1957 offense, and S 1957 defines 
"criminally derived property" to mean property 
"constituting, or derived from, proceeds obtained from a 
criminal offense." 18 U.S.C. S 1957(f)(2). Moreover, Cefaratti 
was reasonably sophisticated, having obtained a bachelor's 
of science degree in accounting and having successfully 
managed another beauty school without incident for sixteen 
years. See Liboro, 10 F.3d at 864-65 (harmless error to omit 
"one of Rule 11's many `warnings' " where, inter alia, 
defendant "held a responsible position requiring 
considerable sophistication"). On these facts, any deviation 
from Rule 11(c)(1) was harmless. 
 
Cefaratti's final contention with respect to his plea 
agreement is that the District Court erred under Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 11(f) by entering judgment when there was no 
factual basis to support the S 1957 count. Rule 11(f) 
provides that "[n]otwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of 
guilty, the court should not enter a judgment . . . without 
making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a 
factual basis for the plea." Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(f). The court 
may make that inquiry by looking to the defendant's own 
admissions, the government's proffer of evidence, the 
presentence report, or "whatever means is appropriate in a 
specific case -- so long as the factual basis is put on the 
record." United States v. Smith, 160 F.3d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 
1998) (quotation omitted); see also United States v. Allen, 
804 F.2d 244, 245 (3d Cir. 1986). The court " `need not be 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt tha[t] an accused is 
guilty. It need only be convinced that there is sufficient 
evidence to justify the reaching of such a conclusion.' " 
United States v. Alber, 56 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(quoting United States v. Neel, 547 F.2d 95, 96 (9th Cir. 
1976) (per curiam)). 
 
Here, the District Court specifically found that Cefaratti's 
"plea has a basis in fact," although it did not spell out the 
basis for that finding. United States v. Cefaratti, No. 98-cr- 
00212 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 1998) (order accepting guilty 
plea). A district court's finding of a factual basis for a plea 
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is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Smith, 160 F.3d 
at 122; United States v. Mitchell, 104 F.3d 649, 652 (4th 
Cir. 1997); United States v. Bernaugh, 969 F.2d 858, 865 
(10th Cir. 1992).3 Furthermore, although courts have held 
that "an insufficient factual basis can never be harmless 
error" under Rule 11(h), United States v. Tunning, 69 F.3d 
107, 114-15 (6th Cir. 1995), they have refused to set aside 
a guilty plea where the record as a whole, including 
evidence not presented to the district court at the plea 
hearing, demonstrates a factual basis for the defendant's 
plea, see United States v. Zorrilla, 982 F.2d 28, 30-31 (1st 
Cir. 1992); United States v. Adams, 961 F.2d 505, 512 (5th 
Cir. 1992). 
 
Cefaratti argues that the only allegation of "money 
laundering" in this case is that he caused "the Franklin 
Beauty School to receive, in its own bank accounts, the 
loan moneys which it had fraudulently sought" from the 
DOE. Appellant's Br. at 21. He argues that these funds 
were not proceeds until they came into Franklin's 
possession and that neither the information nor the 
government's summary of evidence at the plea hearing 
alleged that he conducted any monetary transactions with 
the funds after that point. 
 
Cefaratti relies on United States v. Johnson, 971 F.2d 562 
(10th Cir. 1992), which involved a defendant who defrauded 
investors into wiring funds directly to his account, 
ostensibly for him to buy Mexican pesos at a discount rate 
and later resell them at a profit. The indictment in that 
case charged numerous counts of money laundering in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The government maintains that Cefaratti's failure to raise this issue 
before the District Court necessitates plain error review -- an issue on 
which there is some disagreement in the courts. Compare United States 
v. James, 210 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (plain error 
review), United States v. Angeles-Mascote, 206 F.3d 529, 530 (5th Cir. 
2000) (same), and United States v. Akinsola, 105 F.3d 331, 333 (7th Cir. 
1997) (same), with United States v. Glinsey, 209 F.3d 386, 394 & n.8 
(5th Cir. 2000) (no plain error review, variance from Rule 11 reversible 
unless harmless), United States v. Odedo, 154 F.3d 937, 940 (9th Cir. 
1998) (same), and United States v. Lyons, 53 F.3d 1321, 1322 n.1 (D.C. 
Cir. 1995) (same). We need not decide this issue in light of our 
disposition. 
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violation of SS 1956 and 1957, some of which were based on 
the wiring of funds from the investors directly to the 
defendant's account and some of which were based on the 
wiring of funds from the defendant's bank to the investors. 
The funds involved in all of the transactions were alleged to 
be proceeds of wire fraud, and the defendant was convicted 
on all but one of the counts. The court affirmed some of the 
convictions and reversed others. It reversed the convictions 
based on the wire transfers from the investors to the 
defendant on the ground that the defendant "cannot be 
said to have obtained the proceeds of the wire fraud until 
the funds were credited to his account." Id.  at 570. By 
contrast, the court upheld the defendant's convictions 
based on the wire transfers from the defendant's bank to 
the investors, which occurred after the wire fraud took 
place. 
 
Our precedent is consistent with the court's decision in 
Johnson. For example, in discussing the term"proceeds" in 
the context of S 1956 (the same term as inS 1957), we have 
stated that "[a]lthough [the section] does not define when 
money becomes `proceeds,' it is obvious to us that proceeds 
are derived from an already completed offense, or a 
completed phase of an ongoing offense, before they can be 
laundered." United States v. Conley, 37 F.3d 970, 980 (3d 
Cir. 1994). However, this does not help Cefaratti. The 
counts in Johnson that were insufficient were those where 
"the only use of the wires alleged . . . to prove the predicate 
wire fraud crimes were the very wire transfers that allegedly 
[violated S 1957]." United States v. Kennedy, 64 F.3d 1465, 
1478 (10th Cir. 1995). Thus, in those instances, the 
government failed to prove a monetary transaction 
occurring "after the completion" of criminal activity. Id. By 
contrast, the mail fraud to which Cefaratti pleaded guilty 
was completed when he mailed fraudulent materials in 
furtherance of his scheme to defraud. See id. ; see also JA 
at 78-79 (prosecutor's statement that Cefaratti submitted 
fraudulent materials by wire as well as by mail). Thus, 
when he engaged in monetary transactions with proceeds of 
the criminal activity after the completion of the mail fraud, 
Cefaratti's actions fell within the statute. 
 
As explained in the government's brief and as set forth in 
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the indictment, which was before the District Court at the 
plea hearing, the Stafford Loan checks were mailed to 
Franklin and made payable to both the student borrower 
and the school. These checks had to be endorsed by both 
the borrower and a representative of Franklin before they 
could be deposited into the school's account. We agree with 
the government that, at the latest, the checks became 
criminally derived property when they were endorsed by the 
student borrowers and that any subsequent monetary 
transactions, including deposits, violated S 1957. See 18 
U.S.C. S 1957(f)(1) (monetary transactions include deposit). 
This provides an adequate basis for Cefaratti's plea. We see 
no legal basis for Cefaratti's argument that "[a] check, as 
such, cannot be `proceeds' . . . ." Appellant's Reply Br. at 4; 
see United States v. Haun, 90 F.3d 1096, 1100 (6th Cir. 
1996) (where automobile dealer applied for false titles and 
used titles to defraud purchasers, purchasers' checks 
represented proceeds under S 1956); United States v. 
Hemmingson, 157 F.3d 347, 355 (5th Cir. 1998) (rejecting 
argument that the funds from a check, rather than the 
check itself, were proceeds of interstate transportation of 
stolen property); Kennedy, 64 F.3d at 1477-78 (rejecting 
position that deposit of checks received from defrauded 
investors did not violate S 1956).4  
 
Furthermore, there is little question that the funds 
Franklin unlawfully obtained were subsequently re-invested 
in the Franklin School. As we have stated, Franklin 
operated during the three year period between July 1994 
and July 1997 while receiving over 90 percent of its 
revenues from Stafford Loan and Pell Grant funds. 
Moreover, in a letter Cefaratti submitted to the probation 
officer who was preparing the PSR, Cefaratti specifically 
acknowledged "that the money received through the 
[fraudulent activities] . . . was used to enable me to 
continue to operate and expand the Franklin Beauty School 
and thereby permit me the continuation of the frauds in 
which I was engaged. Among other things, the improperly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Cefaratti has not argued that the deposit of these checks failed to 
meet the requirement that the monetary transaction involve criminally 
derived property valued greater than $10,000. 
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received proceeds were used to build an addition onto the 
Franklin Beauty School." PSR at 7. 
 
Cefaratti argues that his letter to the probation officer, 
despite its clear admission, cannot support his guilty plea 
for two reasons. First, he argues that there is no reason to 
think that the PSR "was using the term [proceeds] in the 
technical sense defined by this Court . . . ." Appellant's 
Reply Br. at 5. However, it was Cefaratti himself, while 
represented by counsel, who used the term "proceeds," and 
he did so in a letter describing his offense conduct. We 
have no reason to interpret it to mean anything other than 
what it says. In any event, Cefaratti admitted the 
underlying facts which demonstrate that the transactions 
at issue involved proceeds in the technical sense. 
 
Second, Cefaratti argues that the District Court did not 
rely upon his statement quoted in the PSR when it accepted 
his guilty plea and that "this Court cannot find and rely on 
a different" factual basis on appeal. Id. However, Cefaratti's 
admission of the use of proceeds was before the District 
Court at the time of sentencing, and he never sought to 
explain or withdraw his statement.5 Nor did he seriously 
argue that the expansion of Franklin with funds obtained 
from the mail fraud could not constitute a monetary 
transaction with proceeds of the mail fraud. 
 
Cefaratti has failed to show prejudice from the failure to 
articulate all of the details of the factual basis supporting 
his guilty plea to a violation of S 1957. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 
11(h); Zorrilla, 982 F.3d at 30.6  We reject his challenge on 
appeal to his conviction on the counts to which he pled 
guilty. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Unlike the situation in Allen, 804 F.2d at 247, on which Cefaratti 
relies, in this case the District Court did not proceed under "a 
misunderstanding of what the defendant ha[d] admitted." 
 
6. Our disposition makes it unnecessary to decide the government's 
contention that Cefaratti may not raise this challenge to his guilty plea 
on appeal. 
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B. 
 
The Application of U.S.S.G. S 2S1.2 
 
Cefaratti also challenges his sentence, arguing that the 
District Court erred by applying U.S.S.G. S 2S1.2, the 
guideline applicable to a money laundering conviction 
under S 1957. Cefaratti argues that his is an"atypical case 
[in which] the guideline section indicated for the statute of 
conviction is inappropriate . . . ." U.S.S.G. Introduction to 
App. A. He contends that he should have been sentenced 
under U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1, the fraud guideline. Cefaratti's 
argument is based on United States v. Smith, 186 F.3d 290, 
300 (3d Cir. 1999), a recent case in which we concluded 
that "the heartland of U.S.S.G. S 2S1.1 is the money 
laundering activity connected with extensive drug 
trafficking and serious crime." Because he did not raise this 
objection to his sentence before the District Court we will 
review for plain error, see United States v. Knobloch, 131 
F.3d 366, 370 (3d Cir. 1997), although we note that our 
decision in Smith was filed on August 9, 1999, more than 
two months after Cefaratti was sentenced. 
 
The defendants in Smith had been convicted of four 
offenses -- conspiracy to defraud, interstate transportation 
of stolen property, causing unlawful interstate travel with 
intent to distribute stolen property, and money laundering 
-- arising out of an embezzlement/kickback scheme. 
GTECH, a lottery service company that sought help in 
obtaining lottery contracts, hired a consultingfirm which 
submitted inflated invoices to GTECH for its services and, 
in return, the consulting firm gave kickbacks to defendant 
Smith, GTECH's national sales manager. At leastfifteen 
checks were made payable directly to Smith's creditors. 
Based on those payments to Smith's creditors, the 
defendants were convicted of money laundering under 18 
U.S.C. S 1956. 
 
The district court in Smith calculated the defendants' 
sentences based on U.S.S.G. S 2S1.1, which applies to 
convictions under S 1956. On appeal, we held that the 
court erred in using S 2S1.1 rather than U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1, 
the fraud guideline. We noted that the Sentencing 
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Commission originally established high base offense levels 
for the money laundering guidelines to penalize the conduct 
that had concerned Congress: "1) situations in which the 
`laundered' funds derived from serious underlying criminal 
conduct such as a significant drug trafficking operation or 
organized crime; and, 2) situations in which thefinancial 
transaction was separate from the underlying crime and 
was undertaken to either: a) make it appear that the funds 
were legitimate, or b) promote additional criminal conduct 
by reinvesting the funds in additional criminal conduct." 
Smith, 186 F.3d at 298 (quoting United States Sentencing 
Commission, Report to the Congress: Sentencing Policy for 
Money Laundering Offenses, including Comments on 
Department of Justice Report at 4 (Sept. 18, 1997)). 
 
We concluded that the defendants' conduct in Smith 
which was the basis of the money laundering charges, the 
15 checks sent to Smith's creditors, did not implicate these 
concerns and was merely an "incidental by-product of the 
kickback scheme." Id. at 300 (quotation omitted). Because 
the "root of the defendants' activity" was fraud, we stated 
that "[t]o use the money laundering guideline in this 
routine fraud case would let the `tail wag the dog.' " Id. 
Moreover, by sending the checks directly to defendant 
Smith's creditors, the defendants left a paper trail that was 
"inconsistent with planned concealment." Id. 
 
Cefaratti's argument assumes that our holding in Smith 
regarding the applicability of U.S.S.G. S 2S1.1 to the Smith 
defendants' S 1956 convictions pertains equally to U.S.S.G. 
S 2S1.2, which applied to Cefaratti's conviction under 18 
U.S.C. S 1957. We will assume arguendo that it does.7 This 
case, however, does not require us to determine the 
circumstances under which a defendant's conduct will fall 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Our holding in Smith concerning sentencing under U.S.S.G. S 2S1.1 
implicitly echoed a concern expressed by other courts when evaluating 
a defendant's S 1956 conviction over transforming that section from a 
money laundering statute into a "money spending statute." See United 
States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940, 946 (10th Cir. 1991). That concern may 
be implicated to a lesser degree by S 1957. See D. Randall Johnson, The 
Criminally Derived Property Statute: Constitutional and Interpretive 
Issues Raised by 18 U.S.C. S 1957, 34 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1291, 1302 
(1993) (unlike S 1956, S 1957 "is indeed a `money spending statute' "). 
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outside the heartland of U.S.S.G. S 2S1.2, because it is 
clear that Cefaratti was appropriately sentenced under that 
guideline. 
 
Cefaratti contends that the District Court should have 
based his sentence on the fraud guideline because his 
conduct did not involve large scale drug trafficking or 
organized crime. However, nothing in Smith states or 
suggests that S 2S1.1 or S 2S1.2 can be used only for 
defendants who have engaged in such conduct. Prior to 
Smith, many of our decisions applied U.S.S.G.SS 2S1.1 and 
2S1.2 in situations involving conduct similar to Cefaratti's 
and did not question the propriety of that application of the 
guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Morelli, 169 F.3d 798, 
809 n.13 (3d Cir. 1999) (sentencing under S 2S1.1; 
proceeds of scheme to embezzle excise taxes on fuel sales 
laundered by wiring funds between companies controlled by 
defendants); United States v. Cocivera, 104 F.3d 566, 570 
n.2 (3d Cir. 1996) (summarily rejecting argument that 
S 2F1.1 rather than S 2S1.2 should have been applied 
where defendant who had committed medicare fraud and 
other crimes was also convicted of 22 counts underS 1957); 
United States v. Conley, 92 F.3d 157, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(sentencing under S 2S1.1; defendant convicted of running 
illegal gambling scheme and conspiring to do the same and 
to launder the proceeds); United States v. Sokolow, 91 F.3d 
396, 410-13 (3d Cir. 1996) (defendant sentenced under 
S 2S1.2 for, inter alia, misrepresenting the nature of his 
benefits plan and defrauding plan members of insurance 
premiums; indictment alleged defendant laundered funds 
through a series of accounts, property, and mortgages); 
United States v. Thompson, 40 F.3d 48, 50 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(defendants who intercepted and diverted funds mailed to 
securities firm sentenced under S 2S1.1); United States v. 
Cusumano, 943 F.2d 305, 312-14 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(sentencing under S 2S1.1 where underlying conduct was 
embezzlement/kickback scheme involving employee benefit 
plan; rejecting argument that "core" offense of conviction 
was kickback scheme rather than money laundering). 
 
Other than distinguishing our decision in United States v. 
Cusumano on the basis that it was issued prior to the 
Sentencing Commission's report to Congress, our opinion 
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in Smith gave no indication that it intended a radical 
departure from this precedent. The authority relied upon in 
Smith did not suggest the restrictive application of S 2S1.1, 
let alone S 2S1.2, that Cefaratti urges. Although we held in 
Smith that the heartland of S 2S1.1 was"money laundering 
activity connected with extensive drug trafficking and 
serious crime," we relied particularly on language in a 
report of the House Judiciary Committee explaining 
Congress' rejection of proposed amendments to the money 
laundering guidelines. We quoted the statement in the 
report that, "the application of the current guidelines to 
receipt-and-deposit cases, as well as to certain other cases 
that do not involve aggravated money laundering activity, 
may be problematic." Smith, 186 F.3d at 299 (quoting H.R. 
Rep. No. 104-272, at 14-15, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
335, 348-49) (emphasis added in Smith). 8 The House Report 
continued that "past sentencing anomalies arising from 
relatively few cases do not justify a sweeping downward 
adjustment in the money laundering guidelines." Id. 
(quoting Report) (emphasis added in Smith). 
 
Smith also relied on the Justice Department's less-than- 
uniform adherence to its stated policy that the money 
laundering statutes "should not be used in cases where the 
money laundering activity is minimal or incidental to the 
underlying crime." Id. at 299 (quotation omitted). Both the 
Justice Department and the House Report were concerned 
that application of the money laundering guidelines may be 
problematic in anomalous cases, such as where the 
defendant simply deposits the proceeds of crime or where 
the laundering activity is minimal or incidental to the 
underlying crime. Neither the House Report nor the Justice 
Department policy suggest that sentencing under the 
money laundering guidelines is appropriate only when the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In Morelli, which was decided several months before Smith, a 
defendant sentenced under the money laundering guidelines argued that 
he was entitled to a downward departure on the basis of the proposed 
amendments that had been rejected by Congress. In rejecting that 
argument, we stated that "proposed amendments to the Sentencing 
Guidelines do not provide independent legal authority for a downward 
departure," although we did not mention the House Report. Morelli, 169 
F.3d at 809 n.13. 
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defendant has engaged in drug trafficking or organized 
crime. 
 
The facts in Smith suggest that we too were particularly 
concerned that the money laundering at issue there-- 
simply sending checks to the defendant's creditors-- 
amounted to little more than receipt and deposit of funds 
obtained by fraud. We therefore read Smith, in conjunction 
with our prior cases, to stand for the unremarkable 
principle that in certain cases "strict focus on the 
technicalities of the sentencing process obscures the 
overarching directive to match the guideline to the offense 
conduct . . . ." Id. at 300 (quotation omitted). In Smith, the 
overarching offense conduct was "routine fraud," and the 
money laundering, though technically a violation ofS 1956, 
was merely an "incidental by product" of that fraud. Id. 
 
Cefaratti next argues that the money laundering he 
engaged in was at most part and parcel of his student loan 
fraud scheme. This equates to an argument that his 
conduct as a whole was little more than routine fraud to 
which the money laundering was incidental. See  Appellant's 
Br. at 31 & n.8 (referring to Cefaratti's fraud as"garden 
variety fare" in federal court). 
 
Cefaratti notes that the parties and the court at 
sentencing seemed to view his conduct as typical of a fraud 
case. He points to his counsel's argument that Cefaratti 
only continued the fraudulent activities begun by his sister 
Carole, who had formerly operated Franklin, because he 
hoped to revitalize the school and eventually to legitimize 
its practices. See JA at 117-21. Likewise, the prosecutor 
referred to Cefaratti's case as "a typical fraud case made a 
bit atypical because of efforts made to destroy evidence 
. . . ." JA at 122. And the District Court, in denying 
Cefaratti's request for a downward departure, stated: "[T]his 
is a typical thing. I mean I have more fraud offenses for 
people who are trying to salvage businesses . . . ." JA at 
145. 
 
Nonetheless, we cannot agree that the District Court 
committed plain error in sentencing Cefaratti under 
U.S.S.G. S 2S1.2. Cefaratti characterizes the money 
laundering in this case as simply the "receipt of the funds 
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from the government, which did not aggravate or conceal 
the fraud offense in any way." Appellant's Br. at 26. To be 
sure, the deposit of the fraudulently-obtained Stafford loan 
checks can be characterized in this manner. However, in 
Smith we emphasized the concern of Congress and the 
Sentencing Commission with separate financial 
transactions undertaken to legitimize illegally-obtained 
funds or to promote additional criminal conduct. Smith, 
186 F.3d at 298. The evidence in this case demonstrates 
that Cefaratti used the proceeds of his mail and wire fraud 
to promote further acts of fraud. 
 
As we have said, over 90 percent of Franklin's revenues 
during a three year period came from Pell Grant and 
Stafford loan funds. Although the record does not make 
clear what percentage of these funds were obtained by 
fraud, Cefaratti does not argue that the percentage was 
insubstantial or that he only reinvested in Franklin the 
funds he had obtained legally. See United States v. 
Threadgill, 172 F.3d 357, 377-78 (5th Cir. 1999) (affirming 
downward departure in S 1956 case where defendants 
laundered only around three percent of illegal gambling 
revenues and did not use laundered money to finance other 
criminal activity). In fact, Cefaratti specifically admitted 
that he used the proceeds of his crimes to continue"the 
frauds in which [he] was engaged," for example by building 
an addition to the Franklin School. PSR at 7. Significantly, 
Cefaratti also admitted to making payments to various 
lenders so "that it would appear as if the students . . . were 
not in default," PSR at 6, and does not suggest that he 
never used proceeds of his fraud for this purpose. 
 
As it is clear Cefaratti used criminally derived property to 
promote further fraud, we cannot say that such conduct is 
minimal or incidental to the underlying fraud, and we 
therefore conclude that the District Court did not commit 
plain error in sentencing Cefaratti under U.S.S.G.S 2S1.2. 
See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 210 F.3d 916, 928 (8th Cir. 
2000) (downward departure from U.S.S.G. S 2S1.1 
inappropriate where defendant led scheme to defraud 
investors and reinvested virtually all of the proceeds in the 
scheme); United States v. Woods, 159 F.3d 1132, 1136 (8th 
Cir. 1998) (stating "[w]e believe [departure from U.S.S.G. 
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S 2S1.2 was appropriate] because . . . deposit of the check 
had the effect of concluding, rather than promoting, the . . . 
fraud").9 
 
C. 
 
The Leadership Adjustment 
 
The District Court calculated Cefaratti's sentence by 
grouping counts IV (the mail fraud count) and XXIII (the 
student loan fraud count) of the indictment with theS 1957 
(money laundering) count in the information pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. S 3D1.2(b), because the counts involved the same 
victim and two or more acts constituting a common 
scheme, and also included in that group count XXVII of the 
indictment (for destruction of property) pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. S 3D1.2(c). Neither party challenges this method of 
grouping. After grouping, the court added two levels based 
on the PSR's finding that Cefaratti "had a managerial role 
over at least three other criminal participants (Gloria 
Malavet, Modesta Perez and Jackie Lopez)." PSR at 8. The 
court added "that there was a point in time where Malavet 
and Perez attended a conference on funding and realized 
that what they were doing was wrong. . . . [Cefaratti advised 
them] not to worry about it and to continue their practice." 
JA at 144. 
 
Cefaratti's primary contention, and the only one that 
merits discussion, is that when "counts are grouped under 
U.S.S.G. S 3D1.2(a), (b), or (c), the guideline level [including 
any adjustments] for each count is first to be determined 
separately" before grouping. Appellant's Br. at 34. When 
counts are grouped under these sections, the defendant's 
sentence is based on "the highest offense level of the counts 
in the Group." U.S.S.G. S 3D1.3(a). In this case, the court, 
applying that instruction, based Cefaratti's sentence on the 
offense level applicable to the S 1957 count. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. In keeping with our standard practice, we decline to consider 
Cefaratti's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
raise 
this issue at sentencing. See Cocivera, 104 F.3d at 570. 
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Cefaratti argues that even if he had been a leader in the 
fraud, which he disputes, he played no leadership role in 
the money laundering, and that the offense level applicable 
to the fraud count, even when adjusted for the leadership 
role, would have been less than that for the (unadjusted) 
S 1957 count. The offense level applicable to the group 
would therefore have been two levels lower. Cefaratti 
objected to the leadership adjustment in the District Court, 
but not on this basis. Because Cefaratti never presented 
the District Court with any variant of the technical 
argument he now raises, we review for plain error. See 
Knoblach, 131 F.3d at 370. 
 
We cannot find error, much less plain error, in the 
District Court's sentence. Even if Cefaratti is correct that 
the court should have determined the applicability of the 
adjustment before grouping, there was sufficient evidence 
to support a leadership adjustment on both the fraud and 
the money laundering count. "The determination of a 
defendant's role in the offense is to be made on the basis of 
all conduct within the scope of [U.S.S.G.]S 1B1.3 (Relevant 
Conduct) . . . and not solely on the basis of elements and 
acts cited in the count of conviction." U.S.S.G. Ch. 3 pt. B, 
introductory commentary. Relevant conduct includes, inter 
alia, "all acts and omissions committed, . . . commanded, 
. . . or willfully caused by the defendant . . . . that occurred 
during the commission of the offense of conviction, in 
preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting 
to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense." 
U.S.S.G. S 1B1.3(a). 
 
Here, the record contains ample evidence that Cefaratti 
played a leadership role with respect to the money 
laundering. At sentencing Cefaratti's counsel specifically 
admitted that Cefaratti "did exercise a managerial function 
with respect to the secretarial staff," JA at 132, and did not 
qualify this admission by stating that the managerial 
function extended only to the fraud. Instead, his counsel 
argued that the ultimate goal of Cefaratti's leadership was 
to cease Franklin's unlawful practices and that, in order to 
accomplish that goal, Cefaratti had to "run the business. 
. . ." JA at 132. But, counsel further stated that Cefaratti's 
conduct in running Franklin "did include acts of 
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wrongdoing. There is no question about it. So he exercised 
leadership." JA at 132. Cefaratti was, of course, present at 
the hearing and did not object to these statements. 
 
Furthermore, the record demonstrates that Cefaratti 
instructed Malavet and Perez to submit fraudulent 
deferment and forbearance forms and to mail checks on 
behalf of student borrowers who were nearing default. It 
was the funds derived from those fraudulent activities that 
were "laundered" within the meaning of S 1957 and used to 
promote additional fraud. Cefaratti's leadership in 
instructing his employees to continue their fraudulent 
practices was relevant conduct that supported an 
adjustment on the money laundering count. Without his 
ongoing leadership of the fraud over a period of at least 
three years, "there would have been no ill-gotten gains to 
launder." United States v. Nicolaou, 180 F.3d 565, 574 (4th 
Cir. 1999) (leadership of illegal gambling relevant conduct 
that could support adjustment to money laundering count); 
United States v. Savage, 67 F.3d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(defendant's role in mail and wire fraud scheme is relevant 
conduct for purposes of determining his aggravating role in 
money laundering). It follows that the District Court did not 
err in imposing the adjustment for leadership. 
 
III. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Cefaratti, who negotiated an advantageous plea 
agreement with the Justice Department for the dismissal of 
24 counts, including one charging violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 1956 (a money laundering offense), in return for his 
agreement to plead guilty to four counts charging, inter 
alia, violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1957 (a different money 
laundering offense with a lesser penalty) in the superseding 
information, and who raised no objection to the factual 
recitations made by the government at the hearings on the 
plea agreement and the sentencing, now appeals raising 
highly technical arguments never raised in the District 
Court. The government argues that this represents an 
impermissible disavowal of the plea agreement. We have, 
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nonetheless, reviewed the arguments on their merits and 
conclude that they are not persuasive. 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
judgment of conviction and sentence. 
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